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Forum Juridicum
Brief Comment and Speculation re
Elson v. Mathewes
Harriet S. Daggett*
Another landmark decision on mineral rights has recently
been rendered by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the case of
Elson v. Mathewes.1 The court has again attested its superior
ability to deal skillfully without assistance of legislation with
the intricacies of mineral law. It has furnished a new tool which
will enable the legal profession to pursue a most important busi-
ness of the state with greater certainty and satisfaction to all.
The facts of the case are these: A landowner sold in 1937
one-half of his minerals in a ninety-one acre continuous tract,
consisting of one parcel of forty acres and another contiguous
one of fifty-one acres. His vendee sold one-half of the interest
acquired to a third party, who thereby became a co-owner of
the servitude. In 1943, the landowner separately granted a lease
covering the entire ninety-one acres. In 1944, the servitude
owners separately granted a lease to the same lessee covering
forty acres. In the same year the lessee in the course of forming
a six hundred and forty acre unit for gas exploration caused a
voluntary pooling agreement to be signed by the landowner and
the servitude owners. The agreement covered the forty acres
which had been separately leased in 1943 and 1944, but excluded
the fifty-one acre tract. The pooling agreement acknowledged
the holdings of the several parties and expressed in clear and
unmistakable language their intention to interrupt the running
of prescription against all servitudes in the pooled lands. A pro-
ducing well was drilled in 1944 within the unit but not upon the
tract of forty acres mentioned before.
There was no issue between the litigants that the servitude
on the forty acre tract was still held beyond its original term.
The major issue pleaded by plaintiff servitude owners was that
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 69 So.2d 734 (La. 1954).
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on the basis of the indivisibility doctrine the servitude was still
unextinguished upon the entire ninety-one acres. While recogniz-
ing the theory of indivisibility when its applicability was sound,
the court held in clear and unequivocal language that there was
no legal prohibition against division of the servitude by contract
between the original parties to its creation and that thus the
mineral servitude on the fifty-one acres not included in the
agreement had prescribed since there had been no development
of it within the original term of ten years.
The servitude owners pleaded in the alternative for a share
in benefits accrued to the fifty-one acres not included in the uniti-
zation agreement. They based their claim on the separate lease
granted by the landowner in which their servitude was alleged
to be necessarily included and which they claimed to have rati-
fied and made their own. The court finding "no merit in the
claim" stated that while the landowner's lease was not "specific-
ally limited" to his interest in the minerals, the lease was not
granted "for the benefit" of the then servitude owners and that
the latter had not produced evidence of ratification of the lease
during the life of the servitude.
No dissenting voice is recorded in connection with this de-
cision. The Chief Justice expressed a concurrence. Only one
case, Spears v. Nesbitt,2 was cited in support of the court's con-
clusion, and in which the court declared had "in effect" decided
that a servitude might be divided by contract, in that case by two
leases, one by the landowner and the second by the servitude
owner.
The question of divisibility vel non has plagued the courts
and the legal profession since it arose definitely for decision in
the Sample v. Whitaker cases8 where indivisibility was firmly
recorded while it was in reality denied by the triumph of one
public policy, that of good faith acquisition of land,4 over an-
other which then existed, suspension of the running of prescrip-
tion of servitude against minors.5 Thus was blocked the grooving
of the definitely personal mineral servitude into the usufruct
category which by provision of the Code is susceptible to divi-
2. 197 La. 931, 941, 2 So.2d 650, 654 (1941).
3. Sample v. Whitaker, 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930); Sample v. Whit-
aker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931); Sample v. Whitaker, 174 La. 245, 140 So.
36 (1932).
4. La. Acts 1924, No. 64, p. 91, amending Art. 3478, LA. CIVi CODE of 1870.
5. Art. 3554, LA. CIVM CODE of 1870.
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sion.6 The court created the contiguous estate doctrine7 perhaps
born of the acquisitive prescription theory of possession by boun-
daries, and supported sub silentio by Louisiana's accepted public
policy against holding devices, thus realistically dividing the
servitude. Legislative denial of the indivisibility doctrine is ev-
idenced by the enactment of the statute whereby minors could
continue to enjoy suspension of prescription but would cease
thereby to benefit their major co-owners. 8 Another judicial edict
is found in the Ohio Oil case,9 in which the court for no doubt
excellent reasons but with much seemingly contradictory ver-
biage decided that the servitude being indivisible and only able to
emanate from the landowner-creator, could nonetheless by virtue
of the sale of all mineral rights in a designated tract by the servi-
tude owners create a situation whereby user of one tract would
not hold the other tract. What type of interest was created by the
servitude owner alone has remained somewhat cloudy since the
court so firmly stated that the servitude could not be divided and
that such a right could emanate from the landowner only. Per-
haps this troublesome question will be clarified by the instant
case. Here the court stated that the indivisibility concept could
not be violated by the grantor landowner alone,' the implica-
tion being that the grantee could divide and lighten the burden
although, of course, he could not increase it." This notion is well
supported by articles of the Code when they. bespeak, for
example, the curtailment of use enjoyed by the owner which may
reduce the servitude.12 Thus, it might be reasoned that a servi-
tude owner, selling all of his minerals in a designated tract of
land, part of the area burdened by the original grant, may alone
place the respofisibility upon his vendee to preserve the right to
search for minerals upon the mentioned tract. If that responsi-
bility is sustained, might it not now be boldly stated that the
servitude has been divided and a new one created by the servi-
tude owner alone since the original grantor's burden would not be
increased? If the responsibility is not sustained by the vendee,
6. Art. 538. LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
7. Lee v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923).
8. La. Acts 1944, No. 232, p. 687. See Davidson v. Bolton, 216 La. 677, 44
So.2d 700 (1950). See also La. Acts 1950, No. 510, p. 935, amending LA. R.S.
§ 9:5805 (1950), negating suspension of a mineral right for any incapacitated
person.
9. Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 213 La. 183, 34 So.2d 746 (1947). See also
Byrd v. Forgotson. 213 La. 276, 34 So.2d 777 (1947).
10. 69 So.2d 734, 735 (La. 1954).
11. Art. 797, LA. CI vIL CODE of 1870.
12. Art. 798, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870.
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obviously the landowner grantor has profited by the reduction
of the land area over which the original servitude ranged.
Moreover, it might be stated that the prohibition against di-
viding a servitude applies only to predial servitudes. Excellent
reason for such a position is found in the very language of Arti-
cle 656: "[A] servitude existing in favor of a piece of land, is due
to the whole of it, and to all the parts of it, so that if the land be
sold in parts, every purchaser of a part has the right of using the
servitude in toto." On the other hand, the usufruct, a personal
servitude, is divisible, as explained by Article 538 of the Code:
"Usufruct is divisible; for if this right is vested in several persons
at a time, there is but one usufruct, which is divided among
them, each having his portion. The reason is because the object
of this right is the receiving the fruits of the thing, which are
corporeal and divisible." Loads of earth or sand are not fruits
but are mentioned as a possible object of a rural servitude.18
Minerals, solid, liquid, or gaseous substances, are not fruits under
the long-accepted doctrine that fruits are subject to reproduction
by the original investment of land or money.14 It is hopefully
believed that the judicial declaration to the contrary will be lim-
ited to the issue involved in that case,' 5 an issue no longer im-
portant under adjusted rulings regarding taxation of marital
property. 6 The taking of minerals usually accompanying the
right to search for them is very near to the taking of earth or
sand.
It was certainly fortunate that the usufruct category was
not applied to the mineral servitude since the limitation of the
usufruct 7 to a life term and its many detailed provisions would
have been a doubtful guide for governance of the mineral servi-
tude. The opening article' s of the title dealing with predial
servitudes is misleading, as it seems to indicate that usufruct,
13. Art. 721, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. See also Art. 657, LA. CIVIL CODE of
1870 on division of advantages.
14. Art. 545. LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. See Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66
So. 337 (1914). See also Jackson v. Shaw, 151 La. 795, 92 So. 339 (1922).
15. Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d 679 (1952).
16. Revenue Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 110 (1948). See also § 351 (eliminating
community property provisions of § 811(e) of the Internal Revenue Code);
§ 361 (adding the marital deduction provision to § 812 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code); and §§ 104(c) and 301 (providing for the splitting of income be-
tween spouses by amending § 12 of the Internal Revenue Code); Rubin &
Champagne, Some Community Property Aspects of the 1948 Revenue Act, 9
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1 (1948).
17. Art. 606, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. But see Art. 610, LA. CIVIL CODm of
1870.
18. Art. 646, LA. CiVI CODE of 1870.
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use and habitation are the only personal servitude. Other articles
in the chapter dealing with conventional servitudes 9 indicate
several other kinds of possible personal servitudes, which doubt-
less could also be created as predial if the contracting parties so
desire. Ingress and egress,2° right of taking water are listed as
possible personal servitudes. 21 One article of the Code,2 2 enum-
erating the principal (not all, it will be observed) rural servi-
tudes mentions passage, way, aqueduct, watering, pasturage,
burning brick or lime and, most important of all to our topic,
that "of taking earth or sand from the estate of another." It is
noteworthy that the life term is indicated in the urban ingress
and egress example "unless otherwise expressed in the title."' '
Furthermore, there is a general provision that servitudes "per-
sonal to the individual" terminate with his life "unless the con-
trary has been expressly stipulated. '24 Under the sale form used
to establish the mineral servitude, the grant is made usually to
the vendee, his heirs and assigns. Since the mineral servitude is
definitely personal, only one tract of land being involved, it may
be logical to apply to it the divisibility granted to personal ser-
vitudes. 25
The whole confusion which arose in the past while the con-
cept of mineral servitudes was being painfully evolved by the
court might presently be cleared. Obviously under the original
grant, a contract, the vendee may not appropriate more benefits
than his contract called for,26 but if he or his vendee of a part
elects to take less, that would seem to be their privilege. Since
the mineral servitude is discontinuous and therefore may only be
acquired by title,2 7 a landowner is protected against third per-
sons claiming it by acquisitive prescription.
The contract in the instant case was drafted as an acknowl-
edgment with intent to interrupt the running of the prescription
against the servitude. Thus it would appear that a new term
would ensue even without any further drilling and a fortiori
when a dry hole has been drilled. The acknowledgment in the
instant case was a contract for the mutual benefit of the parties,
19. Art. 709 et seq., LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
20. Art. 719, LA. CrvIL CODE of 1870.
21. Art. 720. LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
22. Art. 721, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
23. Art. 719, LA. CivIL CODE of 1870.
24. Art. 758, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
25. Art. 647, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
26. Art. 797, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
27. Savage v. Packard, 218 La. 637, 50 So.2d 298 (1950).
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unitization, and thus carried consideration. In other cases the
lack of consideration has been a disturbing factor in the applica-
tion of an acknowledgment theory unsupported by the usual
natural consideration accompanying other applications of this
theory.28 The legal term of right to search for minerals is part of
the value of the original grant and the vendor has no obligation,
moral or otherwise, to increase the term. Obviously, the land-
owner has a right to grant what in effect is a new servitude; but
such a grant, if recognized as a donation, would be subject to
the principle of reduction 29 established for protection of forced
heirs and to the few limitations ° upon the power of the husband
over community property including prohibition against dona-
tions of immovables.31 Under recognition of acknowledgment of
a mineral servitude without consideration these limitations
doubtless may not apply though an attack as of a donation in
disguise is a speculative possibility. 2
In the instant case question has arisen concerning the effect
had drilling occurred upon the forty acres included in the unit
during the life of the original servitude. It would appear under
the court's analysis of the specific contract involved that the
original servitude might have been preserved; but under the
broad rule announced, certainly a contract might be drawn to
prevent such a contingency.
The doctrine of extension of the term of the servitude by
joint lease has left unanswered questions. The use of phrases
indicating the life of the lease"8 leave debatable, for example,
the effect of a bona fide drilling without production or user oc-
curring after the original servitude has expired but during its
extended term. If the lease were abandoned, would the user be
an interruption of the running of the prescription against the
servitude or would it die with the lease which had extended its
original term? Under the doctrine of the instant case this ques-
tion may perhaps be answered with greater certainty and land-
owners with proper counsel and conveyancers in general may
28. James v. Noble, 214 La. 196, 36 So.2d 722 (1948). See Smith, The
Principle of Mutuality of Obligation and its Juridical Utility in Enforcing
Contractual Fair Dealing, 1 FESTSCHRIFT FiR ERNST RABEL 279 (1954).
29. Art. 1502 et seq., LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
30. Art. 2404, LA. CivIL CODE of 1870.
31. La. Acts 1938, No. 205, p. 491; La. Acts 1950(2 E.S.), No. 6, p. 14. See
LA. R.S. § 9:1105 (1950).
32. Arts. 2444, 2464, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; Bertuccl v. Bertuccl, 69 So.2d
502 (La. 1953).
33. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Miller, 69 So.2d 21 (La. 1953).
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find advantage in these apparent opportunities for avoidance of
litigation.
The author of the opinion in the instant case was also respon-
sible for the strong and convincing dissent in the much discussed
case of Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co.8 4 It may well be that his un-
successful efforts in that struggle with lease indivisibility helped
to make possible the present decision regarding divisibility of
the servitude. Certainly, forced pooling is beyond the import of
the instant decision grounded squarely on voluntary joint con-
tract. On the basis of the equitable principle, however, the land-
owner has a stronger case for servitude division when forced
into a pooling arrangement than in case of a voluntary contract.
Since the back of the indivisibility theory seems to have been
broken it might be possible that the court, taking advantage of
the freedom offered by our civilian system,35 can make adjust-
ments in the landowner's favor to compensate him for unduly
lengthening the term of the servitude or lease under an order
by the Commissioner. Such an order was issued to conserve the
resources of the state and not with intent to affect unduly the
operation of previous private contracts. Had the indivisibility
principle been applied in the instant case, the original grant
would have been made more burdensome, extended far beyond
its intended scope, and estimated value by, an outside purpose,
unitization, not in reasonable contemplation of the original
contract or directly related to it. The query left by the Sanders-
Flowers case,8 6 namely, suspension or interruption, might be
solved without reference to either of those doctrines under the
division principle carrying out both the purpose and intent of
an order under the police power and the original scope of the
contract between the parties.
However the many hypothetical situations may be resolved,
there can be no doubt that the decision under discussion will
have far-reaching effect. It may lead to more certain dealing
and may also be instrumental in warding off too hastily con-
sidered legislation in an ever-moving field necessarily calling for
a reasonably flexible legal pattern amenable to proper and
equitable adjustment.
34. 211 La. 893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947); LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil & Refining
Co., 218 La. 463, 49 So.2d 855 (1950). See also LeBlanc v. Southern Produc-
tion Co., 202 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1953); Smith v. Carter Oil Co., 104 F. Supp.
463 (W.D. La. 1952).
35. Lee v. Jones, 69 So.2d 26 (La. 1953).
36. Sanders v. Flowers, 218 La. 472, 49 So.2d 858 (1950).
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Modification of contracts by the original parties thereto is
a common occurrence in every branch of the law. It would be
indeed strange to deny it to the contractual relationship between
landowner and servitude owner. Articles 748 and 752 of the Code
clearly contemplate adjustments by the original contracting
parties. The following brief statement from the highest court
of the state should brave logical contradiction in law and equity
and give heart particularly to the landowner. "[T]here is no law
prohibiting the landowner and the mineral owner from enter-
ing into a contract with each other, as was done by and between
these litigants, whereby a division or a reduction of the servitude
results."37
Legal Aid
ITS CONCEPT, ORGANIZATION AND IMPORTANCE
John S. Bradway*
Legal aid work' essentially is a state of the individual lay
mind, an individual professional point of view, and the answer
of the organized bar to a public demand for a means for imple-
menting some of the basic legal principles undergirding the
American way of life. This activity is carried on generally in a
material framework of law office, bricks, mortar, desks, filing
cabinets, and books. But at the center of the concept there are
always a client asking help and a lawyer giving it. Functionally
37. 69 So.2d 734, 735 (La. 1954).
* Professor of Law, Duke University; Director Legal Aid Clinic, Duke
University.
1. Elihu Root, writing in 1919 the Foreword to Reginald Heber Smith,
Justice and the Poor, CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING,
Bull. No. 13, p. ix (1919), saves us the trouble of a long series of references
by summarizing the circumstances which in this country brought the need
for legal aid to public attention. He says: "We have had in the main just
laws and honest courts to which people-poor as well as rich-could repair
to obtain justice. But the rapid growth of great cities, the enormous masses
of immigrants (many of them ignorant of our own language), and the
greatly increased complications of life have created conditions under which
the provisions for obtaining justice which were formerly sufficient are suffi-
cient no longer."
Vance, The Historical Background of the Legal Aid Movement, 124
ANNALS 6 (1926), makes clear that the need was one continuing through the
development of Western Civilization.
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